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Abstract
Team production is introduced into a two-sector Ricardian comparative advantage model in
order to investigate its role in shifting high-skilled agents from a sector in which they have com-
parative advantage to a sector in which they have comparative disadvantage especially focusing
on a case where environments of team production in the latter sector are improving. The first
result is that team production changes the nature of comparative advantage, possibly leading to
reallocation of creativity. The second result is that the likelihood of the shift is limited, and even
in a case of success, policy targets (improving the environments of team production) should be
selected carefully since those targets are different in the likelihood of shifting creativity, and the
most likely case is associated with non-monotonic dynamics of the allocation of creativity.
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1 Introduction
Transformation of a system of cities from sectoral to functional specialization (Duranton and Puga,
2005) and the increasing importance of interactive tasks in economic activity (Michaels et al., 2013)
pose a challenge for local policy makers in attracting creativity since skill-intensive, non-routine
economic activity concentrates in larger cities which have a comparative advantage in such activity.2
Given the above concern, this paper investigates the role of team production in affecting the
allocation of creativity by developing a two-sector Ricardian comparative advantage model with team
production and two types of agents, high-skilled and low-skilled. The two sectors consist of global
and local sectors, the former (latter) of which is defined as the one in which the high-skilled (low-
skilled) have a comparative advantage. In both sectors, team production is allowed, connecting one
high-skilled agent as a manager to some low-skilled agents as workers and allowing for managers to
leverage their knowledge effectively. Under an interpretation that global and local sectors correspond
to larger and smaller cities, respectively, I introduce an additional type of team production in the local
sector, in which managers can learn about local advantages through communications with workers.
The implications are two-fold: First, team production changes the nature of comparative advan-
tage, i.e., team production could be a tool of shifting creativity from global to local sectors. Second,
the likelihood of the shift is limited, and even in a case of success, policy targets should be selected
carefully since those targets are different in the likelihood of attracting creativity, and the most likely
case is associated with non-monotonic dynamics of the allocation of creativity.
This paper is related to two literatures: First, the model is an extension of Garicano and Rossi-
Hansberg (2006) to multiple sectors and additional form of team production. Second, the literature of
knowledge creation such as Berliant and Fujita (2012) is related. However, the focus is on collabora-
tions between high-skilled and low-skilled agents not those between creative people.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, the structure of the model is described.
Then, in Section 3, policy implications are obtained focusing on equilibria resembling functional
specialization of cities. The final section, Section 4, concludes this paper.
2 The Model
2.1 Environment
I consider a Ricardian closed economy with two competitive sectors, global g and local `, and two
types of agents, high-skilled h and low-skilled l. ` agents have a comparative advantage in ` sector,
the relative price of a good in which is denoted by p> 0. Production is specified as problem solving:
Given one unit of time endowment, each agent draws one problem per unit of time, each associated
2 Functional specialization is a system of cities, in which larger cities specialize in skill-intensive, non-routine economic
activity such as research and development, while smaller cities in less skill-intensive, more routine ones such as line
production which based on technologies developed by the former cities.
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with some level in (0;1) of knowledge required to solve. i-agent level of knowledge in k sector is
denoted by ki 2 (0;1), and the law of large numbers implies sector-g (-`) income of i agents is given
by gi (p`i) under self-employment. The following absolute and comparative advantages are assumed:
g< l < gh; `l < `h; and gl=`l < gh=`h. The relative supply of l agents is fixed to r> 1.
2.2 Team Production
In both sectors, team production a´ la Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) is allowed in addition to
self-employment. More precisely, there are one common and one `-specific forms of team production.
2.2.1 Common Form
In a team of the common form in sector k, one h-agent manger and nk l-agent workers constitute a
team. First, workers draw and try to solve problems by themselves, implying (1 kl)nk problems are
left unsolved. Second, workers pass (1  kl)nk unsolved problems to their manager with communi-
cation cost ck per unit of problems. Finally, the manager suggests how to fix those problems to her
workers if she knows, and the suggested workers solve the problems. In total, the team as a whole
can solve khnk problems. The manager’s time constraint determines the team size nk = 1=[ck(1 kl)].
In this paper, I focus on a case where communication cost ck satisfies
1
r(1 gl) < cg <
gh gl
gh(1 gl) ;
1
r(1  `l) < c` <
`h  `l
`h(1  `l) ; (1)
implying that team production is productive compared with self-employment, and l agents have never
bargaining power in wage determination. Given this assumption, hmanagers exploit the rents of their
teams, which are given by the zero-profit condition.
2.2.2 `-specific Form
With `-specific team production, an h agent can invest her time (in addition to communication cost)
to raise her productivity from `h to a`h, where a2 (1; ` 1h ). An interpretation is as follows: hmanager
can apply their knowledge well-suitable to activities in g sector to those in ` sector and can still earn
incomemore than l agents do. However, with learning about local advantages such as scenery, culture,
history and etc., the quality of output increases further. Rather than simply designing a conventional
building in a beautiful scenery, designing a building in accord with such nature makes the place more
valuable. The time cost of learning is specifically given by iceberg-type cost t> 1, i.e., with learning,
passing (1  `l)n` unsolved problems in a team requires the manager tc`(1  `l)n` units of time.
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2.3 l-agent Choice
Since l agents cannot become a manager and have no bargaining power,3 income levels are equalized
across self-employment and workers of teams in both sectors. The resulting environment is exactly
the same as in a simple Ricardian model, i.e., letting pl  gl=`l , l agents choose g sector if p< pl and
` sector otherwise. This optimal choice implies that the wage rate wl of l agents is given as follows:
wl = gl if p< pl , and wl = p`l otherwise.
2.4 h-agent Choice
In addition to self-employment, h agents can become the manager of a team in either g or ` sector.
In addition, if an h agent chose to form a team in ` sector, then she must also choose which type of
team she forms. For notational convenience, let gs and `s denote self-employment in g sector and
that in ` sector, respectively. Also let g, `w=, and `w=o denote teams in g sector, those with learning
in ` sector, and those without learning in ` sector, respectively. Therefore, h agents choose one of
fgs; `s;g; `w=; `w=og. Note that for a chosen form f 2 fg; `w=; `w=og of a team, productivity z f and team
size n f are determined, implying that the wage rate wh; f of h manager is given by wh; f = (z f  wl)n f .
Since the wage rate wh; f of managers depends on the wage rate wl of l workers which in turn
depends on the relative price p, h-agent choice should be discussed conditional on p.
2.4.1 Indifference Curves: p< pl
If p < pl , then the wage rate wl of l workers is given by wl = gl . Due to comparative advantage,
h agents also choose gs if they chose self-employment. However, note that gs is never chosen by h
agents when p< pl . This is simply because wh;g > gs, which holds under (1).
Therefore, h agents are effectively faced with three options: g, `w=, or `w=o. It is convenient to
provide equations associated with indifference curves:
I`w=`w=o :
pa`h gl
tc`(1  `l) =
p`h gl
c`(1  `l) =) p=
gl
`h
t 1
t a(t 6= a) (2)
Ig`w= :
gh gl
cg(1 gl) =
pa`h gl
tc`(1  `l) =) p=
gl
a`h

1+ t
c`(1  `l)
cg(1 gl)
gh gl
gl

(3)
Ig`w=o :
gh gl
cg(1 gl) =
p`h gl
c`(1  `l) =) p=
gl
`h

1+
c`(1  `l)
cg(1 gl)
gh gl
gl

: (4)
For notational convenience, let p`w=`w=o denote the relative price corresponding to the indifference
curve associated with `w=  `w=o. In a similar manner, I use similar notations for the other cases.
When emphasizing that the relative price is a function of some parameter q, I use the expression like
p`w=`w=o(q).
3 The former is not an exogenous assumption. That is, although l agents can choose to try to form a team, there is no
productivity gain, making no agents willing to participate in such a team.
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2.4.2 Indifference Curves: p> pl
If p > pl , then the wage rate wl of l workers is given by wl = p`l . Due to comparative advantage, h
agents also choose gs if they chose self-employment. In this case, preferring g to gs is not necessarily
the case since the choice is dependent on the relative price p.
Therefore, h agents are effectively faced with four options: gs, g, `w=, or `w=o. It is convenient to
provide equations associated with indifference curves:
I`w=`w=o :
pa`h  p`l
tc`(1  `l) =
p`h  p`l
c`(1  `l) =) t=
a`h  `l
`h  `l ; (5)
Ig`w= :
gh  p`l
cg(1 gl) =
pa`h  p`l
tc`(1  `l) =) p=
gh
`l +(a`h  `l) cg(1 gl)tc`(1 `l)
; (6)
Ig`w=o :
gh  p`l
cg(1 gl) =
p`h  p`l
c`(1  `l) =) p=
gh
`l +(`h  `l) cg(1 gl)c`(1 `l)
; (7)
Igs`w= : gh =
pa`h  p`l
tc`(1  `l) =) p= gh
tc`(1  `l)
a`h  `l ; (8)
Igs`w=o : gh =
p`h  p`l
c`(1  `l) =) p= gh
c`(1  `l)
`h  `l ; (9)
Igsg : gh =
gh  p`l
cg(1 gl) =) p=
gh
`l
[1  cg(1 gl)] (10)
3 Results
3.1 h-agent Choice in (q; p) Coordinates
Assuming that initial parameters satisfy the following
1< cg(1 gl)+ c`(1  `l) `l
`h  `l ; (11)
h-agent choice is summarized in (q; p) coordinate (Figure 1-6),4 where q is either one of three param-
eters of interest: learning cost t, productivity gain a, and `-sector communication cost c`. Under this
assumption, there exists a range of gs of some positive measure in (q; p) coordinate. The condition
is rewritten as pggs < pgs`w=o , where pggs and pgs`w=o are given by (10) and (9), respectively. By
imposing the above assumption, I focus on a situation “severe” for ` sector in that shifts in h-agent
choice from g sector to ` sector is not smooth.
4 The definitions of thresholds are given in Appendix A.1.1-A.1.3.
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3.2 Relative Supply Curves
Given h-agent choice in Subsection 3.1, the shifts of the relative supply curve of ` good for decreasing
t, increasing a, and decreasing c` are obtained as depicted in Figure 7-10, Figure 11-14, and Figure
15-21, respectively.5 For ease of exposition, the lower and upper bounds for (t;a;c`) are omitted.
3.3 Numerical Experiment
3.3.1 Equilibrium of Interest
In this paper, I focus on the simplest case where agents’ preference is specified by a Cobb-Douglas
function with expenditure shares, ag and a`, of g and ` goods, i.e., ag +a` = 1, implying that the
relative demand for ` good is given by ap 1, where aa`=ag > 0. Depending on the ratio a, various
equilibria are possible, and thus there are many “dynamics” of `-sector share lh in h agents when t
or c` decreases or when a increases.
Therefore, I focus on equilibria with the following properties: First, a must satisfy
gl
gh
[rcg(1 gl) 1]< a< [rcg(1 gl) 1][1  cg(1 gl)]: (12)
Second, it must hold that maxftˆ2;1g < t, which is equivalent to 1 < a < aˆ2 given that t > 1; or
cˆ`;1 < c` if tˆ1 < t and c˜`;1 < c` otherwise.
In this type of equilibrium, all h agents are initially g-team managers, while l agents are either
employed by those managers or self-employment in ` sector. To some extent, this captures functional
specialization of cities reported by the literature (Duranton and Puga, 2005) with an interpretation
that this system of production corresponds to team production in g sector. Possible scenarios of the
dynamics of lh are illustrated in Figure 24-36. For decreasing t, increasing a, and decreasing c`,
Scenario 0-4, Scenario 0-1 and A1-A2, and Scenario 0-4 and C1-C6 apply, respectively.6
3.3.2 Results of Monte Carlo Simulation
Compared with the other two parameters, a decrease in `-sector communication cost c` is most ef-
fective in shifting h agents from global to local sectors in that the measure of Scenario 0, the share
of Scenario 0 in the samples, is lowest for most of the pair (r¯; t¯) of the upper bounds for the relative
supply of l agents and learning cost (Figure 22).
As for `w=-specific parameters (t;a), there is no clear ranking in that the measure of Scenario 0
tends to be higher in t-lh dynamics when t¯ is low, while the contrary holds when t¯ is high (Figure
22). This suggests effective policy targets depend on cases. When learning cost t is high (t¯ is high),
team production with learning is costly, making the effect of increasing productivity gain a limited.
5 The definitions of the relative quantities are given in Appendix A.1.4.
6 These possible scenarios of comparative statics of lh are identified analytically.
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I also report the measure of each scenario other than Scenario 0 for each dynamics in Figure
23. The left, the center, and the right panels show measures of scenarios in t-lh, a-lh, and c`-lh
dynamics, respectively, while the lower, the middle, and the upper panels show measures of scenarios
for low, middle, and high t¯, respectively.
There are at least two properties common across all dynamics. First, as the measure of Scenario
0 decreases due to changes in t¯, then measures of other scenarios shift upward.
Second, for lower r¯, an equilibrium with lh 2 [0;1) is likely to happen, while an equilibrium with
lh = 1 does for higher r¯. More specifically, for low r¯, Scenario 2 (or Scenario A1 in the case of
a-lh dynamics) and Scenario 1 are likely to happen, while scenarios with lh = 1 happen with zero
probability for sufficiently low r¯. However, for high r¯, scenarios with lh = 1 become more likely to
happen, and among those scenarios, Scenario 4 in t-lh dynamics, Scenario A2 in a-lh dynamics, and
Scenario 3 in c`-lh dynamics are of measures comparable with those of scenarios with lh 2 [0;1).
The second property is a result of general equilibrium effects of the relative supply r of l agents.
When r is relative large, the relative demand for ` good is more likely to be higher than the relative
supply, resulting in h agents all engaging in team production in ` sector, because the supply for g
good including that from self-employment of l agents, those not employed by h agents, increases as
the relative supply r of l agents increases.
An important policy implication observed in Figure 23 is that when encouraging team produc-
tion in ` sector, i.e., improvements in cost and benefit (t;a;c`), effects on lh are likely to be non-
monotonic, necessitating a careful policy management. Specifically, Scenario 2 (or Scenario A1) has
the highest measure than those except for Scenario 0.7 The mechanism is as follows: When lh is in-
creasing, the equilibrium relative price p is higher than pl , implying that l agents not employed by h
managers in g sector all engage in `-sector self-employment. Given that those l agents do not benefit
from the improvements, a lower communication cost c`, say, by increasing the relative demand for `
good due to a decrease in the price p, requires some h agents to fix the excess demand for ` good.
The contrasting result holds in a phase where lh is decreasing (or constant in a-lh dynamics).
4 Conclusion
This paper introduces team production a´ la Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) into a two-sector
Ricardian comparative advantage model to derive implications for policies encouraging team produc-
tion in local sectors to attract creativity. The first implication is that team production could be a tool
of shifting creativity from global to local sectors. However, policy targets should be selected carefully
since those targets are different in the likelihood of attracting creativity, and the most likely case is
associated with non-monotonic dynamics of the allocation of creativity, the second implication.
7Note that Scenario A1 has no decreasing phase in a-lh because the relative demand and supply have the same elasticity
with respect to a. However, this phase can be interpreted as an ineffectiveness of policies increasing productivity gain a.
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A Appendix
A.1 Definitions
A.1.1 Thresholds in (t; p) Coordinate
The thresholds tˆ1, tˆ2, and tˆ3 are given by (5), substituting pggs into (6), and substituting pl into (6),
respectively:
tˆ1  a`h  `l
`h  `l ;
tˆ2  a`h  `l
`l
1  cg(1 gl)
c`(1  `l) ;
tˆ3  gl
`l
a`h  `l
gh gl
1 gl
1  `l
cg
c`
:
Given (11), tˆ3 < tˆ2 < tˆ1.
The threshold c1 is given by
c1 
gl
`l
a`h  `l
gh gl
1 gl
1  `l :
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A.1.2 Thresholds in (a; p) Coordinate
The thresholds aˆ1, aˆ2, and aˆ3 are given by solving (5) for a, substituting pggs into (6), and substituting
pl into (6), respectively:
aˆ1 

1  `l
`h

t+
`l
`h
;
aˆ2  `l
`h

1+ t
c`(1  `l)
1  cg(1 gl)

;
aˆ3  `l
`h

1+ t
c`(1  `l)
cg(1 gl)
gh gl
gl

;
and the ranking 1< aˆ1 < aˆ2 < aˆ3 holds.
A.1.3 Thresholds in (c`; p) Coordinate
The thresholds cˆ`;1, cˆ`;2, and cˆ`;3 in Pattern 1 are given by substituting pggs into (7), substituting pl
into (7), and substituting p`w=`w=o given by (5) into (7), respectively:
cˆ`;1  `h  `l
`l(1  `l) [1  cg(1 gl)];
cˆ`;2  gl
`l
`h  `l
gh gl
1 gl
1  `l cg;
cˆ`;3  a 1t a
gl
gh gl
1 gl
1  `l cg;
and the ranking 0 < cˆ`;3 < cˆ`;2 < cˆ`;1 holds. The thresholds c˜`;1 and c˜`;2 in Pattern 2 are given by
substituting pggs into (6) and substituting pl into (6), respectively:
c˜`;1  a`h  `l
`l
1  cg(1 gl)
t(1  `l) ;
c˜`;2  gl
`l
a`h  `l
gh gl
1 gl
1  `l
cg
t
;
and the ranking 0< c˜`;2 < c˜`;1 holds.
A.1.4 Relative Quantities
The relative quantities in Figure 7-21 are defined as follows:
sg  `lgh [rcg(1 gl) 1]; sgs 
`l
gh
r; s`w= 
a`h
gl
1
rtc`(1  `l) 1 ; s`w=o 
`h
gl
1
rtc`(1  `l) 1 > s`w= :
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A.2 Numerical Experiment
A.2.1 Algorithm
For each fixed set of upper bounds, r¯ and t¯, the algorithm below is used to generate random samples
and conduct comparative statics.
Step 1: Generate samples of parameters (`l; `h;gl;gh;r;cg;c`;a;t) of size of one million from the
uniform distribution over the subset of parameters satisfying the stated conditions:
(a) Generate `l at random such that 0< `l < (1  r¯ 1).
(b) Generate `h at random such that [r¯=(r¯ 1)]`l < `h < 1.
(c) Generate gh at random such that 0< gh < 1.
(d) Generate gl at random such that 0< gl < (`l=`h)gh.
(e) Generate r at random such that `h=(`h  `l)< r r¯.
(f) Generate a at random such that
1< a<min

` 1h ;
`l
`h

1+ t¯
gh
gl
`h  `l
`h

:
(g) Generate cg at random such that
max

1
r(1 gl) ;
`h  `l
`h(1 gl) ;
1
1 gl  
t¯
1 gl
`l
`h
`h  `l
a`h  `l

< cg <
gh gl
gh(1 gl) :
(h) Generate c` at random such that
max

1
r(1  `l) ;
`h  `l
`l(1  `l) [1  cg(1 gl)];
a`h  `l
t¯`l(1  `l) [1  cg(1 gl)]

< c` <
`h  `l
`h(1  `l) :
(i) Generate t at random such that maxftˆ2;1g< t t¯.
Step 2: For each sample, construct equidistant grid points on the following closed interval of a
under which an equilibrium relative price p satisfies pl  p pggs :
gl
gh
[rcg(1 gl) 1] a [rcg(1 gl) 1][1  cg(1 gl)];
and compute the share of each scenario in the grid points.
Step 3: Compute the sample average of the share of each scenario.
Step 1 in the algorithm ensures that parameters satisfy the required conditions. Possible scenarios
are illustrated in Figure 24-36, the conditions of which are omitted due to limitations of space. For t¯,
10
I consider three values: low (1.1), middle (1.5), and high (2.0).8 r¯ ranges from 2 to 20.
8 Learning within ` team increases time cost of passing unsolved problems by 100 (t 1)%. t¯ gives the upper bound
for this increase, and “low,” “middle,” and “high” correspond to the maximal increase of 10%, 50%, and 100%, respectively.
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Figure 6: h-agent Choice in (c`; p) Coordinate,
Pattern 2, tˆ1 > t
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Figure 7: tˆ1 < t
Figure 8: tˆ2 < t< tˆ1
Figure 9: tˆ3 < t< tˆ2
Figure 10: 1< t< tˆ3
13
Figure 11: 1< a< aˆ1
Figure 12: aˆ1 < a< aˆ2
Figure 13: aˆ2 < a< aˆ3
Figure 14: aˆ3 < a
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Figure 15: cˆ`;1 < c`
Figure 16: cˆ`;2 < c` < cˆ`;1
Figure 17: cˆ`;3 < c` < cˆ`;2
Figure 18: (inffc`g=)c` < c` < cˆ`;3
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Figure 19: c˜`;1 < c`
Figure 20: c˜`;2 < c` < c˜`;1
Figure 21: (inffc`g=)c` < c` < c˜`;2
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Figure 22: Measure of Scenario 0
Note: Low, middle and high t¯ correspond to values of 1.1, 1.5, and 2.0, respectively.
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Figure 23: Measures of Scenarios in Dynamics
Note: Low, middle and high t¯ correspond to values of 1.1, 1.5, and 2.0, respectively.
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Figure 24: Scenario 0
Figure 25: Scenario 1
Figure 26: Scenario 2
Figure 27: Scenario 3 Figure 28: Scenario 4
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Figure 29: Scenario A1 Figure 30: Scenario A2
Figure 31: Scenario C1 Figure 32: Scenario C2
Figure 33: Scenario C3 Figure 34: Scenario C4
Figure 35: Scenario C5 Figure 36: Scenario C6
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